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constraints. Like in other countries, they seek to hire the most desirable applicants from the available pool in the presence of uncertainty about applicants' skills. But in their choice over how to recruit workers, they have different ability to infer applicants' desirability, and different limitations on their practices. Desirability of workers is also judged by different criteria.
The focus in our study is the choice of Chinese firms regarding the screening of job applicants' personal information during recruitment, the determinants and the extent of such screening, and consequences for firms' performance. This topic is important because Chinese employers practice extensive screening of applicants using factors that are illegal to consider per se, or thought of as inappropriate by various standards.
1 They inquire about applicants' political affiliation, ethnicity, marital status, family background, appearance, blood type and other personal factors. Moreover, firms' job advertisements typically also specify the gender, age, health status, appearance or family registration status of preferred applicants. This study sorts these different forms of screening into four types by their distinct motives -statistical, customer taste-based, employer taste-based, and regulatory -and evaluates which employers and which market situations are likely to produce extensive screening of each type.
Categorization of a regulatory motive for applicant sorting in China is one of the contributions of this study, as it has not been discussed in economic literature previously.
This classification is important because different types of screening have different implications for the firms and for job applicants. Yet, there is currently limited understanding of firms' motives, prevalence of the different practices across firms, as well as implications for society. Better understanding may help us identify pitfalls in firms' practices and in the existing public policy.
This study follows up on a survey of the recruiting market in China with a review of firms' motives for stating preferences on job advertisements and screening applicants on application forms (Hlasny and Jiang, 2013) . The closest other studies Shen, 2009, 2013) have evaluated employers' preferences on job advertisements, and found that they could be only partly explained by statistical and customer-taste motives, with latent cultural factors overriding them in lower-skill recruitment. This paper differs from those studies in its subject and analytical approach. It focuses on questions on firms' job application forms, as the more detailed second-stage screening following the posting of preliminary minimum specifications on job advertisements. The results are compared to those for the stated preferences on job ads, in a sample of 225 application forms and 148 job advertisements of large employers from across the Chinese economy. Analytically, this study starts by classifying individual personal characteristics screened by their inferred motive into four types, and evaluating how firms' and market circumstances affect the extent of each type of screening. Secondly, it tests the implications of the four screening types for firms' profitability. As a byproduct, this test helps to validate the classification of characteristics screened into the four conceptual types.
In what follows, the study first reviews the historical context of labor relations under which Chinese firms adopt specific recruiting practices, and the applicant screening practices widely used. Section III sketches a custom model identifying theoretically the four distinct motives for applicant screening. This model yields testable predictions regarding the form and extent of screening used by employers in different settings. Section IV describes our empirical approach and information available. Finally, Sections V and VI present the empirical results and comment on their implications.
II. Background of Labor Recruitment in China
Human resource management (HRM) practices at Chinese firms today can be linked to political and economic developments in the country over the past six decades. In the 1950s, as the Chinese central government abolished free factor markets and implemented central planning to achieve a Great Leap Forward, employers came to operate under public ownership of all factors of production. Labor placement and working conditions were harmonized across the economy. In support of regional planning, a family registration (hukou) system was set up in 1958 by the Ordinance of Household Registration of the PRC.
This system dictated where workers with agricultural or nonagricultural registrations could be employed, and restricted migration (Chan and Zhang 1999) . 2 State-owned enterprises 2 Beside the system of agricultural vs. nonagricultural registrations, regional personnel management and university admission systems were implemented to restrict free movement of people. Employers or even local Public Security Bureaus managed workers' official personnel records, and tracked workers' progress through life in these records. Depending on the content of workers' records, employers could prevent workers from changing work, moving or even getting married (Moss 1996) . University entrance policies also effectively restricted movement of people, by reserving a number of university openings to candidates with local hukou, and by requiring students to take the entrance examination in students' place of residence. The content of the (SOEs) were allocated workers based on workers' formal qualifications, political affiliation and hukou, rather than on inferred true skills (Ding and Warner 2001) .
A quarter-century later, when central planning failed to spur economic growth, important economic reforms were implemented. Under the Reform of the Economic System (1978), companies in many sectors were privatized and reorganized. Firms of all ownership types were encouraged to compete for qualified labor. Private employers took advantage of looser regulation to use any means to recruit talent and to induce effort among their workforce. In hiring, promotion and compensation, employers started discriminating among workers using detailed information on workers' personal and even protected characteristics, without fear of government clampdown. Statistical discrimination -employers' strategy to hire more productive workers using information on their personal attributes and membership in particular social groups, and information on distribution of skills across social groups -and customer taste-based discrimination -employers' strategy to raise customers' willingness to pay by hiring appropriate workers -were becoming refined features in all aspects of firms'
HRM.
Even before deregulation, employers' decisions had traditionally been tainted by employers' own tastes for workers' physical features, healthy looks, amenable character and fitting zodiac signs -including features that were irrelevant or unobservable to customers, and unrelated to productivity. Regulation had also forced firms to discriminate based on workers' political affiliation, class background and hukou registration. As employers became more educated, and labor market became deregulated and more competitive, employer tastebased and regulatory forms of discrimination faded and were replaced by statistical and customer taste-based forms. These in turn became explicit, systematic and widespread.
Economic reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s brought growth to industrial cities along the east coast. This exacerbated the gap between urban and rural living standards (Park 2008; Meng 2012 ) and increased migration from rural western provinces to eastern cities. As the number of migrant workers rose, employers started taking workers' residency and ethnicity into explicit account, in view of labor-cost implications of hiring non-locals, 3 examination varied across provinces, forcing students to spend 1-2 years in their home town to pass the local exam. 3 Because migrant workers did not have secure housing and state-provided health and welfare coverage, they were expected to be costlier to employ. Should the employer wish to retain the worker or reassign them to a different branch, a rural hukou was also harder to convert to an urban one. Finally, migrant workers were expected to need to periodically travel home, and have higher turnover.
binding hukou registration rules, and customers' tastes over workers' dialect and demeanors.
Employers' freedom to offer different working conditions to different groups of workers exacerbated the systematic discrimination and mistreatment of replaceable workers and workers without bargaining power such as migrants.
By the 1990s, following rapid economic growth, the central government started worrying about social harmony and international approval, and started pushing for equitable working conditions. Health and workplace safety regulations and antidiscrimination laws were enacted, even if not enforced, and monitoring of regional inequalities began. 4 Under the 'grasp the large and let go of the small' SOE reforms of 1993, central government kept the requirement for state and investor owned companies, and companies in industries with public stake (strategic industries) to report the demographic composition of their workforce. The government has also pushed to relax the hukou registration rules, in order to resolve the regulation-based discrimination against migrant workers and to improve their access to social services. To this day, however, the reforms have done little to promote migrants' rights (Cai 2007 ). The stricter workplace safety regulations also had some perverse effects on workers'
rights. As hospitality and healthcare firms received a mandate to test job applicants for transmittable diseases including hepatitis B, employers in other sectors followed suit with detailed screening of applicants' health conditions beside those specified by the government.
All in all, despite market-equalizing reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, nationwide labor market remains segmented and unequal (Brandt et al. 2011) . Across provinces, industries and firm types, employers face different applicant pools, reporting rules, and degrees of enforcement of labor regulations by regulators or labor representatives. They differ in their perceived need and ability to select job applicants based on applicants' personal characteristics, be it for statistical, idiosyncratic taste or regulatory reasons. 4 The first anti-discrimination provisions appeared in the Constitution of the PRC (1982) 
Firms' Recruiting Practices
Most Chinese employers use formal as well as informal channels to seek out suitable candidates. Formal channels include advertising on dedicated, publicly-accessible websites, in newspapers, or through independent employment agencies that provide detailed information about openings to the general public. Informal channels include unsolicited queries from jobseekers, nepotism and referrals by influential connections or employees, or other word of mouth referrals (source: own survey). This study focuses on employers' formal practices, because they are more widespread, and information on them is more widely available and transparent.
Recruitment can typically be broken down into four steps: attracting of suitable candidates, their classification, communication with pre-selected applicants, and reaching an agreement (Chen 2002) . This study focuses on the first two steps (hereafter, documents stage), of posting of appropriate job announcement and application instructions, and selecting of information that will be used to classify job applicants. 5 Special attention is paid to the employer-selected content of job advertisements and application forms.
Firms' job advertisements list requirements, preferences or characteristics of ideal applicants (hereafter, prerequisites). Applicants pre-selected on these criteria are then asked detailed personal questions on lengthy application forms, and may be asked to release confidential government-held records to the employers including residence, criminal, or even personal debt records. The prerequisites and information requested on application forms include detailed personal characteristics with bearing on workers' productivity, trustworthiness, sociability, or likeability among customers and colleagues. The prerequisites on job advertisements include specific age range, gender, degree of physical attractiveness, health status and hukou. Application forms additionally ask for applicants' photograph, family background, marital status, ethnicity, political affiliation, blood type and existence of any internal referral. Since the factors screened on firms' application forms are the focus of the present study, they are briefly introduced below. The discussion above suggests four principal motives why employers screen applicants' personal characteristics. Statistical motive is that the collected information on workers' membership in various social groups may help employers infer their productivity or loyalty.
Customer taste-based motive is that firms' customers may value certain characteristics in the personnel serving them, which affects their willingness to pay. Employer taste-based motive follows the hiring manager's own preferences over workers' characteristics beside their impact on firm profit. Finally, regulatory motive is to comply with explicit or implicit rules over information collection and recruitment, as perceived by the employers. Section III reviews these motives in greater conceptual detail, and section IV discusses the method for classifying each characteristic screened into the four types. The following note explains why all forms of screening of personal characteristics regardless of motive are thought to be inappropriate and of concern to public policy.
Public Policy Concerns over Applicant Screening
There are various standards of propriety for factors considered to select workers. This includes legality of recruiting practices and information collected; procedural justice and objectivity; consistency and unbiasedness across decision-makers and subjects; review by multiple professional decision-makers; content-fairness and relevance to applicants' merit; job-relatedness; non-invasiveness; falsification-proneness; and outcome-fairness (Arvey and Renz 1992; Gilliland 1993 Gilliland , 1995 Truxillo, Steiner and Gilliland 2004; Hlasny and Jeung 2014) . All the screening practices described above are in violation of some of these norms.
With regards to efficiency, the identified forms of applicant profiling are inappropriate because they taint employers' view of candidates and affect their hiring and compensation choices by characteristics other than applicants' own job-related skills. Such practices result 7 Beside factors listed above, some companies ask for additional personal information. Employers in transportation, and selected engineering, manufacturing & pharmaceutical sectors (5 employers in the sample) typically enquire about eyesight with or without glasses, and color blindness, as they require advanced precision skills in their employees. In these industries, workers' eyesight is carefully checked in physical examinations, and surveyed in application forms. However, eyesight is not included among the personal factors analyzed here, because of its direct impact on productivity in selected occupations, and low prevalence rate. Unlike in other East Asian countries, Chinese companies typically do not screen applicants' religion, military experience (but some enquire about veteran status), financial status (including real estate or car ownership, or financial status of family members), or smoking & drinking habits. For description of prerequisites on job advertisements, refer to Hlasny and Jiang (2013) .
in denying of work opportunities to otherwise qualified workers, say, when employers reject them based on employers' personal preferences or because of inaccurate inference of workers' skills (Phelps 1972) . Such discrimination can be systematic, and persistent even across generations in the workers' families.
The second problem with employers' recruiting practices is that they affect workers' incentives for skill acquisition and job search. Workers respond to the recruiting practices by obtaining skills and attributes that employers appear to value, even if these attributes do not make them more productive. This results in socially inefficient levels of investment and wrong allocation of workers' resources across different activities. This also prevents creditconstrained workers from disadvantaged backgrounds from moving upward socially.
While the personal characteristics screened are not related directly to productivity, many of them are correlated with workers' protected status, and their usage or even consideration is banned by relevant laws. The Employment Services and Management Regulations prohibit employers from including discriminatory factors in job advertisements, including national registration, ethnicity, gender, age, health status and religion. The Labor Act also explicitly bans employers from considering applicants' ethnicity, race, gender and religion. Employers' observed practices are thus in violation of these regulations. Gender, ethnicity, hukou and health prerequisites also infringe on the Employment Promotion Law of the PRC, which prohibits employment discrimination against women, ethnic minorities, rural workers, the disabled and carriers of epidemic pathogens.
Under these laws, workers encountering discrimination may lodge lawsuits in the people's courts (ILO 2011). However, lack of clarity regarding the prohibited forms of discrimination, lack of monitoring and enforcement, and workers' fear of retribution for whistleblowing still limit the effectiveness of laws at protecting workers. At the same time, applicants are required to provide the surveyed information fully and truthfully. Hence, Chinese firms are only partially constrained in their applicant screening practices, and can optimize regarding the extent of each type of screening subject to a tradeoff between the expected marginal benefits and finite expected marginal costs of each type.
III. Theoretical Model of Applicant Screening
This section outlines a custom theoretical model of applicant screening in firms' recruitment. This model casts light on the determinants of the form of screening at different firms, and the effect of different forms of screening on firms' performance. It follows theoretical models of statistical and taste-based discrimination (Becker 1971) 
where = ( ) • ( ) − . The employer's utility u is assumed separable in economic rent π, one-time recruitment cost r, and idiosyncratic taste g, a standard assumption. By focusing on a single hiring decision, the employer's total economic rent, taste and utility are also implicitly assumed separable in the rent, taste and utility obtained from each hire. In effect, issues such as complementarity among workers and employee discrimination are assumed away.
Employer's economic rent depends on the average revenue product of the worker, which depends on the worker's average productivity f, consumers' willingness to pay for the output Recruiting cost comprises the explicit outflow of resources for requesting, collecting, storing and analyzing of information on applicants, as well as any expected implicit loss of firm goodwill, regulatory sanctions, and litigation cost under the selected kind of applicant screening and discrimination. For simplicity, the cost of complying with regulation on hiring D≥δ applicants is assumed to be zero here. This cost is not too important conceptually, because it cannot be avoided, and it may be lower as it does not comprise any loss of firm goodwill or litigation cost. However, regulation δ is still costly to the employer as it limits the effective applicant pool and distribution of A, B, C in the pool.
Solution under Perfect Information
Suppose The selected values of A, B and C depend on the respective first derivatives and crossderivatives of the recruiting cost function, conditional on D≥δ:
They also depend on the first-derivatives of the average-productivity, customer-valuation, and employer-taste functions, conditional on D≥δ:
df/dB, dp/dC, and dg/dA. Finally, the selected values of A, B and C depend on the distribution of these characteristics in the available applicant pool, and on pool size N. The greater the variation of these characteristics in the pool, the greater the expected values in an applicant ultimately hired.
For simplicity, assume that the values of applicants' characteristics are independent of each other, so that the joint probability distribution of the four characteristics is simply the product of the four individual probability distributions. Width of the distributions of A, B, C and D in the applicant pool, and particularly their right tails, affect the employer's rent and overall utility positively, as they increase the expected values of A, B, C in an ultimate hire.
Size of the pool N affects the employer's utility similarly.
The restriction on hiring only D≥δ applicants affects the employer's expected utility negatively as it shrinks the applicant pool and may narrow the joint distribution of A, B and C in the pool. Similarly, the extent to which the employer receives taste value from applicants' characteristic A, dg/dA, affects his expected economic rent negatively as it compels him to favor applicants with higher values of A, even if they have lower values of B and C. There is a tradeoff between pursuing applicants with high values of one characteristic, and pursuing applicants with high values of other characteristics.
9
If the values of the characteristics were not independent of each other, restricting the pool to only, say, D≥δ applicants will have a more complicated effect on the joint distribution of other variables in the remaining pool. Say, if characteristics B and D are correlated positively, the regulatory restriction will increase the prevalence of high values of B in the remaining pool. The issue of correlation among variables is discussed more in Footnote 11. On the other hand, complementarity may exist between B and C, in the sense that d 2 π/dBdC>0, but this issue is ignored here for simplicity. 10 Say, subject to achieving at least a reservation level of expected utility from the hire, E [u(•) In this imperfect-information setup, the employer has two problems: how much to screen applicants, and whom to hire. The second problem is analogous to that under perfect information. The employer hires the applicant with a utility-maximizing set of expected values * , * , * complying with government regulation D * ≥δ. The selected values of * , * , * depend on the first derivatives and cross-derivatives of the recruiting cost function,
Solution under Uncertainty about Applicant Type
also depend on the first derivatives of the average-productivity, customer-valuation, and employer-taste functions, conditional on * ≥δ: df/d * , dp/d * , and dg/d * . Finally, they depend on the joint distribution of * , * , * in the applicant pool.
The more interesting problem is how much to screen applicants. The chosen values of 
12,13
12 The recruiting cost may theoretically depend on both the latent type of the hire (e.g., under adverse impact laws), as well as the extent of screening (e.g., cost of collecting and analyzing information, and under adverse treatment laws). 13 An important simplifying assumption until now has been that applicants' characteristics are independent of each other. As a result, the employer's choice over the value of one characteristic (say, B * ), or extent of one form of screening (Θ B ) had no bearing on the probability distribution of another characteristic (say, A * ) in the applicant pool, or the need for another form of screening (Θ A ), except through restricting the effective size of the Finally, our setup allows us to make different predictions for employers facing small versus large application pools per opening, N. The larger the applicant pool, the greater the difference between the unconditional expectation of A * , B * , C * of the hired worker, and their conditional expectation thanks to the screening of A θ , B θ , C θ . Hence, the greater the benefit from one-time screening of applicants.
Solution at Heterogeneous Employers

Testable Hypotheses
The above model yields several predictions about the determinants and consequences of the extent of firms' screening -the chosen values of Θ A , Θ B , Θ C , Θ D -that can be tested using available data. The first set of predictions concerns the determination of the extent of screening of each kind. In sum, parameters ρ, α, γ, β, δ, N should have bearing on screening practices (as indicated in the set of equations 3 below). Hypothesis 6: The extent of screening of one kind should affect the extent of screening of other kinds negatively, as long as the underlying variables of interest are related nonnegatively. However, to the extent that there are unobservable firm-specific characteristics, some firms may be predisposed to asking few questions of all kinds, say because they face high latent screening costs. If we fail to confirm the negative relationship among Θ A , Θ B , Θ C in our sample even after controlling for economic factors, that may serve as evidence that latent firm-specific effects are systematic and important.
IV. Empirical Approach and Data
Our empirical approach is to formulate an estimable model of the role of firms' screening; collect information on firms' actual screening practices, firms' characteristics and performance, and market and regulatory circumstances; classify screening practices into the four conceptual types; and use regression analysis to evaluate the theoretical predictions and comment on the classification of screening practices.
The model in Section IV has generated several predictions about the determinants of applicant screening along the four dimensions of screening. While the model does not make any predictions about firms' usage of individual screening questions -because that depends on unobservable correlations between the underlying characteristics of interest and alternative screening questions, as well as among various screening questions -it makes predictions about the extent of each kind of screening. 16 For instance, small firms may exhibit greater heterogeneity of screening practices than large firms. The Breusch-Pagan test rejects homoskedasticity for all screening types except for customer-taste screening. In the small sample, this is interpreted as clear evidence of heteroskedasticity. using only exogenous variables, satisfying rank and order conditions for valid SEM instruments. In the second stage, equations 3 are estimated using predicted values of Θ -k among explanatory variables. In the third stage, standard errors are re-estimated by accounting for the covariance among ε k .
17 As a benchmark specification, equations 3 are specified as linear equations. Alternatively, because Θ k take on only several non-negative integer values, the relationship between explanatory variables and Θ k may be modeled as exponential, and the distribution of errors characterized as Poisson. 18, 19 Since the means of question counts in table 2 are typically smaller than the respective variances, mild underdispersion is suspected. Coefficient standard errors in all models are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and in Poisson models -for arbitrary dispersion.
Data Collection
Data for the empirical analysis come from several public sources. Job application forms available on employers' own recruitment webpages represent the main source of information.
We considered only employers' own recruiting practices and restricted the sample to advertisements and application forms on employers' own websites. We did not analyze generic job application forms available from online job portals, because it was unclear how representative those application forms were of decisions taken by individual employers in specific hiring situations.
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A convenience sample of the largest 250 companies in China is compiled based on firms' 2010 sales revenues. The application forms were for the 2010 recruiting season. 215 of the 17 This method allows consistent identification of coefficients on all regressors provided that instruments are valid, and that order and rank conditions are satisfied -essentially that several exogenous variables appear only in first-stage equations, and several exogenous variables appear only in a subset of second-stage equations. This method also produces a corrected covariance matrix of residuals in the four equations. After estimating the SEM, one can test whether endogeneity was a significant problem in the first place, and can comment on the validity of (overidentifying) instruments, although small sample size may render the tests inconclusive. 18 Under Poisson distribution and exponential functional form, (̃| ) = (̃| ) = ( ), where x are all the explanatory variables and σ are the corresponding estimable parameters. The probability that ̃ takes a particular integer value ̃ is Hlasny 2014) . 19 As a test of robustness to misestimation in a small sample, equations 3 are also estimated using separate ordinary least squares (OLS) or Poisson regressions (with or without ̃− among explanatory variables). These specifications correct standard errors for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. These models may be inconsistent and less efficient as they treat ε A , ε B , ε C , ε D as independent. Their results are available on request. 20 Intermediate agencies may be influenced by their own objectives, resource availability, and information environments. Employers' webpages inform us of employers' own decisions regarding recruiting practices, rather than of decisions taken by intermediate hiring agencies or workers themselves. Evidence on employers' webpages reflects the decisions by firms' own personnel departments regarding information to be sought from job applicants, and what position to adopt vis-à-vis anti-discrimination laws. In any case, the vast majority of firms recruit workers by themselves, rather than using recruiting agencies. 250 surveyed companies had application forms for openings on their websites. Among the 215 companies, we collected 225 unique application forms. 21 The SEM requires a balanced panel, which in our sample means omission of one firm with missing data.
The content of firms' application forms and prerequisites in their job advertisements (henceforth, the documents-stage screening practices) are linked to other information on firms' characteristics, and their market and regulatory circumstances. The information for all 215 firms (225 application forms), available from companies' own websites and annual reports, includes companies' sales revenue, value of assets, number of employees, operations abroad, ownership, main industry group, and the province of headquarters. Profit rate is available for a subset of 149 companies (156 applications). Labor-market indicators at the province level include unemployment rate and proportion of college-educated workers. Table   3 provides the description and summary statistics of variables used.
On firms' application forms, we limit our analysis to ten personal questions that may be problematic from a legal or ethical viewpoint, and that were asked by more than five employers: hukou (asked by 81% of employers); marriage status (69%); party affiliation (65%); ethnicity (60%); photograph (47%); height and weight (43%); family background (31%); health (12%); blood type (8%); and internal referral (5%). 22 Questions related to education, work experience or habits are omitted because it could be argued that employers are justified in asking them. While employers may have discriminatory motives for asking those questions, evidence of this is lacking. Secondly, personal questions asked by fewer than five employers are omitted, because the cases could be outliers and could influence other results. Reasons why these firms ask the rare questions are unknown, and could differ across firms or be subject to randomness. Inclusion of these cases would only sidetrack our analysis.
21 Eleven companies used different application forms for different openings. For instance, positions for experienced candidates, and for recent graduates used different application forms and advertised different prerequisites. Of the 215 firms, 201 use the same application form to recruit both groups of workers, and recruit them on their own. 12 of the 215 firms apply different standards to different groups, and 2 firms only ask for free-style resumes. Of the 12 firms using different standards, 6 firms conducted 'experienced recruitment' themselves but entrusted campus recruitment to recruiting agencies; 6 firms recruited both groups themselves. 22 In addition, 52% of companies asked about applicants' hobbies or interests; 92% about present or expected salary; 56% about work, other experience or training; 37% about years of experience, present job or reasons for switching jobs; over 40% about educational major, classes failed, awards won or other special skills. Some companies also asked about reasons for applying, self-evaluation, career plans, military experience, experience abroad, tenure of membership in the Communist party. With respect to joint occurrence of these individual questions across application forms, table A1 indicates that questions classified as being of the same type are more highly and significantly correlated with one another, in part due to apparent hierarchical relationships (Hlasny 2011 (Hlasny , 2014 : Firms are significantly more likely to screen workers' party affiliation if they also screen hukou, and ethnicity if they screen party affiliation and hukou. Similarly, firms are significantly more likely to screen height and weight if they also screen marital status, and health if they screen marital status, height and weight, or family background.
Classification of Questions into Four Conceptual Types
Firms screening health are much less likely to screen blood type. 24 These patterns suggest that employers follow a systematic routine when designing their application forms, with specific motives in mind. More detailed and intrusive questions of any type are asked only if more general questions of that type are asked first. These patterns help to verify the proposed 24 Of the firms screening workers' hukou (183 cases), 71% also screen party affiliation. Of the firms that do not screen hukou (43 cases), only 39% ask about party. Questions about hukou thus apparently serve as a 'prerequisite' for questions about party. Restricting our attention to the 183 cases screening hukou, we find that firms screening party affiliation are more likely to screen ethnicity (78% of the 130) than firms that do not (30% of the 53). Similarly, firms screening marital status are more likely to screen height and weight (50% of the 155) than firms that do not (27% of the 71). Restricting attention to the 155 cases screening marital status, firms screening height and weight are more likely to screen health (19% of the 78) than firms that do not (9% of the 53). A final note is warranted. While this classification allows us to test the specific predictions from Section IV, this is attained at a potential cost of inaccuracy in the subjective Table 4 presents the results of two SEM specifications explaining jointly the extent of the four types of personal screening on firms' application forms, ̃ ∀ . These models assume linear functional form in the determination of ̃ and normality of ε k . 26 Columns 1-4 present a benchmark model using only theoretically-motivated explanatory variables, while columns 5-8 present a full specification, using additional control variables that were deemed conceptually and empirically relevant. Coefficients in table 4 can be interpreted as the average marginal impacts of a unit-increase in the explanatory variables on the count of personal factors screened, ̃. To preserve space, we will not discuss individual coefficients but merely qualitative trends apparent across columns. 25 Another criticism of the above approach is that screening of personal factors may have different motives at different firms. For instance, height may be screened for customer-taste reasons in service occupations, statistical reasons in manual-work occupations, and employer-taste reasons elsewhere. To deal with this issue, Hlasny and Jiang (2013) reclassified questions into the four conceptual types based on their information content as well as firms' characteristics: 1) skills and availability they require of their workers, 2) main customer type, 3) ownership, 4) level of competition in the relevant labor market, 5) other features of the relevant industry or geography and 6) government role. But this more flexible classification is susceptible to inaccurate assignment at individual firms, and endogeneity in regressions. Regression results using this approach are generally stronger but likely biased. 26 Results of the sets of four separate OLS or Poisson regressions, without controlling or instrumenting for ̃− , or systems of seemingly-unrelated regressions, are omitted for lack of space. Their results are generally weaker than the main SEM results and are likely biased. Hausman's and Wooldridge's specification tests, and Breusch-Pagan error-covariance tests indicate that the SEM specification is more appropriate than SUR, 2SLS or OLS specifications. Finally, SEM models in which different employers are allowed to have different motives for screening individual personal characteristics also yield qualitatively similar -but stronger and likely biasedresults as those reported. These results are available on request (also refer to Hlasny and Jiang 2013). regressions perform slightly less well in terms of overall fit. Hence, tables 4 and 5 will be discussed jointly, and only qualitative differences between them will be noted.
V. Findings
Statistical screening
In Section IV, statistical screening was predicted to be driven by firms' demand and workers' supply of skills, and any regulatory constraints on statistical screening. Under a hypothesis that statistical screening is important for firms whose performance is sensitive to workers' skills, we expect that firms in skill-and capital-intensive industries will practice it most extensively. The lower the mean educational achievement in the province, the greater the right skew of the distribution of skills may be, and the greater the risk that firms would hire a low-skill worker -hence, the greater the benefit of statistical screening. Finally, employers operating under stricter labor-market constraints, such as in foreign jurisdictions, are less able to statistically screen candidates. We may also think that state-owned firms and firms facing more competition in labor market have lower incentives and ability to practice statistical screening. 
Customer-taste screening
Prevalence of direct interaction between workers and customers, and the nature of customers should have bearing on screening motivated by customer tastes. Employers in service and sales industries are expected to conduct more of this screening. Firms' reliance on public-sector orders and on business abroad may be related negatively to the extent of tastebased screening, because public-sector and overseas customers are thought to have less taste for discrimination and to shun intrusive taste-based practices. Regulation in these sectors is also expected to present stricter constraints on firms' practices. Finally, urban employers may conduct more or less of customer-taste screening, depending on whether the willingness to pay of urban consumers is more responsive to workers' characteristics than that of rural consumers, and how effective regulatory and media oversight is in first-tier cities versus elsewhere.
The results in columns 2 and 6 confirm that employers in service and sales industries screen more personal characteristics on application forms (significant in table 5). Prevalence of government customers has a small, mixed effect on customer-taste screening, failing to confirm our a priori conjecture. There is only weak evidence that employers with operations abroad practice less of customer taste-based screening.
Employers in first-tier cities screen more customer taste-based questions on application forms than rural employers (significant in table 5), suggesting that urban consumers' valuation depends more on the appearance and demographic features of company representatives. This corroborates anecdotal reports that urban residents discriminate against non-urban residents, and urban middle-class consumers like to see themselves transacting with equals. Among other results, surprisingly, larger firms and firms in skill-intensive industries appear to practice more of customer-taste screening, statistically significant.
Employer-taste screening
We have hypothesized that employers' taste-based screening depends negatively on the formality of employers' HRM, and on the stringency of the regulatory climate they face.
Columns 3 and 7 evaluate these hypotheses empirically. Unfortunately, there are only imprecise proxies available for the two factors. Proxying for the formality of firms' HRM are the firms' size, state ownership, and location in cities. Proxying for regulatory climate are firms' market share, firm size, and an indicator for whether firms have primarily government customers. Operation in a strategic industry was also considered but eventually omitted from the structural models for collinearity with firms' size, industry indicators, ownership and main customer type.
Empirical evidence of the role of the formality of firms' HRM is mixed. On the one hand, state-owned firms screen applicants less extensively for taste-based reasons (very significant in table 5), as expected. This reflects the fact that state-owned firms operate more bureaucratically, and are more closely overseen by the government. However, unexpectedly, larger firms are shown to practice taste-based screening more extensively. Furthermore, firms in large cities are also estimated to screen applicants more extensively than rural firms. Both of these results are very significant statistically.
Evidence of the role of firms' regulatory constraints is equally mixed. Firms' market share has a small but expected negative effect on the extent of taste-based screening (all coefficients significant), but firms' size has an unexpected positive effect, as noted above.
Reliance on government contracts was also considered as a proxy for regulatory constraints, but was omitted due to poor results -small and insignificant coefficients of opposite signs in tables 4 and 5 -and in order to satisfy the rank condition for valid instruments across columns.
Among other findings, employers in skill-intensive industries and in provinces with a high prevalence of college education screen more for employer-taste reasons than others, against our expectations. The most plausible explanation for these results is omitted variables, or imprecise classification of personal factors by motive: If customer taste-based factors were confounded with employer taste-based factors, we may indeed find large and urban employers screening more in line with the results for customer taste factors.
Regulatory screening
Regulatory pressures for appropriate screening are thought to be strongest at state-owned firms, and large firms with high market power in the output market -because securing of a preferential market position or sufficient capital requires administrative intervention, and because labor at more powerful firms is likely to interact with public authorities. Firms relying on government contracts and those in large cities are also expected to face stricter regulations. On the other hand, firms with operations abroad may be exempted from strict regulatory standards, so that they could comply with equal-opportunity laws and norms in foreign jurisdictions.
The results in columns 4 and 8 confirm that state-owned firms, firms with a stronger market position, and capital intensive firms practice more of regulatory screening, significant statistically in most instances. The results fail to confirm the conjectures about the impact of firms' government contracts, city size or operations abroad on firms' regulatory screening, as their coefficients are insignificant or switch signs. Among other results, firms in skillintensive industries, in provinces with a high prevalence of college education and high unemployment appear to screen less for regulatory reasons. These results are difficult to interpret.
Overall, models estimated in table 4 explain firms' screening practices reasonably well, 27 Analogous regressions were estimated to explain the count of prerequisites on firms' job advertisements. Their results are not as significant as those for screening on application forms, in part because prerequisites have very limited variation in the sample. Conceptually, application-form screening is arguably a more effective method for applicant selection than applicant-pool truncation via prerequisites, and can thus be better explained by economic factors. Screening on application forms gives firms' better control over applicant selection than rigid prerequisites, and does not lead to explicit adverse treatment that would explicitly violate some laws. This explains why application-form screening is more prevalent and extensive, and why cross-firm variation in this practice is more open to statistical analysis. Correlation between the count of factors on application forms and the count of prerequisites is for the most part positive, and is insignificantly different from zero. This is true for the overall counts regardless of motive (r=+0.056), as well as for the counts of screening of each motive. Correlation for statistical prerequisites and screened factors is r=+0.061; for customer taste-based factors it is r=-0.001; for employer taste-based factors it is r=-0.054; and for regulatory factors it is r=+0.184. Hence, omission of the prerequisites from tables 4 and 5 does not appear to affect coefficients qualitatively.
Estimating the four types of screening using a system of simultaneous equations model has yielded consistent and more efficient results than a set of independent regressions or a seemingly-unrelated regressions specification -available on request. The addition of alternative screening methods (instrumented) among regressors allows a more precise estimation of the contribution of each regressor in the structural equations.
28,29
VI. Discussion
This study has described the information environment and the optimization problem that Chinese employers face in recruitment, and identified four distinct motives for applicant screening -statistical, customer taste-based, employer taste-based, and regulatory. The model yielded testable predictions regarding the extent of each form of screening by employers in different economic circumstances, and the implications for firms' observed performance.
Using a system of simultaneous equations with linear and Poisson regression specifications, we have evaluated the theoretical predictions.
On the most fundamental level the study confirms that, on the skill-demand side, the form of applicant screening is systematically related to capital and skill intensity of firms' production, their industry, and their main customers. On the supply side, firms' position in the labor market, urban versus rural locality, and local demography affect screening. Finally, government oversight over industries, firms' ownership, and operation under foreign 28 After estimating the structural model, we evaluate whether error-correlation or endogeneity was a concern in the first place. The Breusch-Pagan test of correlation among ε A , ε B , ε C , ε D rejects a hypothesis of independence (p-value 0.001), justifying the SEM specification over independent 2SLS regressions. The Hausman specification test of the difference between the consistent SEM and the potentially inconsistent SUR coefficients also shows marginally significant difference in the basic model (p-value 0.159) and highly significant difference in the complete model (p-value 0.001). Wooldridge's heteroskedasticity-robust regression-based specification test performed on four independent 2SLS regressions confirms this by marginally rejecting the baseline hypothesis of exogeneity (p-values 0.131-0.977 in basic models, 0.165-0.777 in complete models). 29 Instruments for ̃− used in the SEM appear valid although their strength may be modest. Tables 4 and 5 confirm that the order condition on the exclusion of some exogenous variables from a subset of equations is satisfied. First-stage equations include the entire set of exogenous variables and also include three variables from outside of the second-stage equations (strategic industry, city-strategic industry interaction, and public utility indicators). The results of first-stage regressions, in table A1 in the appendix, also satisfy the rank condition on the significance of instruments. First-stage regressions achieve a modest overall fit with an Rsquared of 0.11-0.22. One quarter of coefficients in table A1 are significant, with coefficient signs for the most part mirroring those in table 4. Variables excluded from the second-stage equations (e.g., for ̃− in column 1 in table 4 this means 1 st -tier city, gov. customers, service & sale industry, unemployment rate, construction, manufacturing, strategic industry and public utility in columns 2-4, respectively, in table A1) are jointly highly significant. Wooldridge's heteroskedasticity-robust score test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the hypothesis that the additional instruments are valid (p-values 0.232-0.979). jurisdictions contribute. These findings validate some predictions about the role of statistical, customer taste-based, and regulatory screening in firms optimization problem.
Across the different motives for screening, statistical and regulatory screening appears the most prevalent, by the number of factors screened and by the number of firms employing it. Statistical screening is related positively to employers' capital intensity, labor-market power and private ownership, and negatively to the supply of skills in provincial labor markets. These results in principle agree with the predictions from the theoretical model.
Customer taste-based screening is linked positively to service and sales industries, in agreement with theory, and interestingly to wealthy first-tier cities. The determinants of employer taste-based screening are less significant and clear, in part because it is far less prevalent among firms. The best predictors of taste-based screening appear to be private ownership and, surprisingly, location in major cities. This presumably reflects some confoundedness between employer-taste and customer-taste screening. Either our classification of the two forms of screening is imprecise, or employers are subject to the same biases that they are aware of in their customers. Like Kuhn and Shen (2013) , we conclude that taste-based screening observed at firms corresponds to our economic understanding only partially. Regulatory screening is well explained by firms' market position, capital intensity, and ownership by the state (all positively), agreeing with our institutional understanding.
In sum, many results of empirical results of this study agree qualitatively with the predictions from the theoretical model. This validates the model as well as the classification of factors screened by firms into four categories by motive. Employers conduct applicant screening in a systematic manner that can be explained by their economic and institutional circumstances and surprisingly even quite systematic tastes. Moreover, screening practices appear to have the expected effect on firms' performance (refer to the appendix), providing further justification for the classification method used: Statistical and customer-taste screening is associated positively with firms' profit rate, while employer-taste and regulatory screening is associated negatively with it. These results hold both for screening on firms' application forms and for prerequisites on job advertisements. Statistical screening appears particularly beneficial to employers in skill-intensive industries, and customer taste-based screening to employers in service and sales industries. If we could interpret these relationships causally, they would support our predictions. These results are in contrast with those reached in previous studies from other countries that firms embracing diversity in recruitment tend to be more successful in terms of stock valuation (Wright et al. 1995) and profit rate (Hlasny and Jeung 2014) .
These findings should prompt greater introspection by firms' HR departments and local regulators into which applicant-screening practices are justified with respect to marketperformance and social-welfare objectives. Regulators should enforce market conditions conducive to desirable practices for the collection and management of information by employers -possibly through relaxation of certain regulatory constraints, providing firms with essential information on workers in more transparent and coordinated ways, civic education campaigns publicizing appropriate social norms, and stricter enforcement of minimum standards of responsible recruiting practices. ' characteristics ρ, α, δ, γ, β and N. As a test of these propositions, and of the sensibility of our classification of factors screened, we regress firms' profit rate on the extent of the four types of screening.
32 Table  A3 presents the results of these OLS regressions. Coefficients in table A3 can be interpreted as the expected marginal impacts of a unit-increase in ̃ on year-end profit rate. Column 1 shows a simple regression of profit rate on the count of factors screened on firms' application forms, controlling only for firms' basic economic variables. Column 2 also accounts for the extent of statistical screening on firms' job advertisements; Column 3, for other types of screening on advertisements; and Column 4, for firms' capital-intensity, operations abroad and one industry indicator. Column 4 is the complete model controlling for all types of screening on firms' advertisements and for circumstances where screening should be most influential -using interactions of the extent of statistical screening on application forms with firms' skill intensity, customer-taste screening with a service-industry indicator, and employer-taste screening with operations abroad.
The first row in table A3 confirms that statistical screening affects profit rate positively. If interpreted causally, an additional factor screened is predicted to raise firms' profit rate by 0.7 percentage points, a large statistically significant effect that is very consistent across columns. The only exception is the last column that controls for screening-industry interaction. Even in this specification, statistical screening is predicted to have a positive effect in skill-intensive industries as well as a positive average affect overall (of -0.474+1.293*0.75 = 0.5 pc.pt.). Similarly, customer-taste screening is estimated to raise profitability in most columns, but the effect is relatively small and varying across columns. Employer-taste screening has a negative effect on profit rate, of consistent size across columns, 0.8-1.1 percentage points per question screened. Regulatory screening also has the expected negative effect in most columns, of varying magnitudes, 0.09-0.49. 33 Hence, the 31 These predictions were made under an implicit assumption that the four characteristics A * , B * , C * , D * were approximately jointly independent in the applicant pool, and that screening of one set of variables (say A θ ) did not affect the predictive power of other variables (B θ , C θ ) positively. Generally, the effects depend on the correlation among the variables of interest and their predictors, and their full joint distribution. 32 These regressions may potentially suffer from endogeneity of explanatory variables as firms make recruiting decisions with specific expectations about their future performance, so the coefficients here may not have a precisely causal interpretation. Instrumenting for the extent of screening should be considered. However, no instruments come readily to mind, since factors that affect firms' recruiting decisions likely affect firms' financial performance too. Instruments would also likely be weak, and yield imprecise and inefficient estimates in the small sample. 33 If we take coefficients in column 4 at face value, we may infer that firms could influence their profit rate by up to 7.8 percentage points (5×0.698 + 3×0.440 + 2×0.977 + 4×0.248), by screening the maximum number of statistical (5) and customer-taste (3) factors, and zero employer-taste (out of 2) and regulatory (out of 4) factors.
vast majority of coefficients on screening variables have the expected signs and are quite consistent across columns. This again helps to validate our classification of questions by employers' motives. However, most coefficients are not significant statistically, due to the amount of noise in the sample and small sample size.
In column 4, interaction terms on screening extents and market conditions also give us mostly the expected coefficients. Statistical screening is particularly profitable at skillintensive firms, in indirect agreement with Shen's (2009, 2013) results, and customer-taste screening is particularly profitable in service and sales industries (the former result significant nearly at the 5% level). However, the interaction term of employer-taste screening and an indicator for operations abroad gives an unexpected positive coefficient. This of course presupposes that the ratio of marginal benefits and marginal costs of screening is similar for the observed and the infra-and extra-marginal factors screened, which is unlikely to hold precisely. 34 Among other results of interest, prerequisites on job advertisements appear to have unclear effects on performance, much less clear than the screening on application forms -positive for statistical prerequisites and negative for regulatory prerequisites, as expected, but of unexpected signs on customer-taste and employer-taste prerequisites. Firm size, market share and capital-intensity appear to have negative effects on profit rate, significant for firm size. This may be due to regulatory climate in China, in which larger firms face more stringent regulatory oversight or protection, possibly leading to a lesser profit drive. Skill-intensive firms tend to be more profitable, while firms in the service industry tend to be less profitable. Note: Each line shows the count of personal factors by motive used by a typical firm screening 2, 4, 6 or 8 personal factors in total, respectively. For instance, a typical firm screening 8 personal factors screens 3.5 statistical, 2.9 customer-taste, 0.8 employer-taste and 3.3 regulatory factors.
